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This paper investigates the contribution of oil supply, global activity and precautionary 
oil-demand innovations for the major episodes of increasing oil prices and US 
macroeconomic fluctuations. The empirical approach employed is based on the 
recursively identified VAR model of the crude oil market proposed in Kilian (2008). 
The estimated results attribute the 2002-2008 oil price increase to global activity and to 
precautionary demand shocks (during the 2004-2006 period). Furthermore, based on the 
responses of US industrial production and producer prices, the distinct innovations are 
shown to produce different macroeconomic effects. Industrial production, in particular, 
is shown to respond positively and significantly to global activity shocks in the short-
run, complementing and reinforcing Kilian’s explanation for the thriving behavior of 
the US economy between 2002 and 2008. Finally, evidence supporting the relevance of 






1. Introduction  
Since the 1970s, oil price shocks have been frequently associated with recessions in 
industrialized countries. Yet, the most recent oil price increase – from about 30 dollars a 
barrel in 2002 to approximately 140 dollars in 2008 – failed to produce a significant 
negative impact on the world economy for several years. This fact has reignited the 
debate on the economic effects of oil price shocks in the literature.  
Although similar in magnitude, the 2002-2008 episode appeared quite different 
from previous oil price shocks. While earlier spikes in the price of oil had been sharp 
and immediate, the most recent price increase proved to be much more prolonged and 
sustained. Several factors have been proposed in trying to explain oil price fluctuations 
prior to 2002, e.g. the low price-elasticity of short-run demand and supply, the 
vulnerability of supplies to disruptions, the peak in US oil production (Hamilton 2009), 
and swings in the precautionary demand for oil (Kilian 2008). Concerning the 2002-
2008 episode, however, the prevailing view has regarded increases in global economic 
activity instead – fueled by the rapid growth of China and India – as having played a 
major role in driving the price of oil up. Realizing that price increases originating from 
distinct sources could be producing different economic effects, a strand of empirical 
literature trying to disentangle structural shocks in the crude oil market – in which the 
current paper fits in – started to evolve.  
In an important contribution, Kilian (2008) modeled the crude oil market in a 
recursively identified VAR framework in order to decompose the real price of oil into 
three components: crude oil supply shocks, shocks to the global demand for industrial 
commodities and demand shocks specific to the oil market (regarded as precautionary 
demand shocks). Kilian’s results showed that, while the previous oil shocks had been 
induced by other factors, the most recent increase in the price of oil was largely driven 
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by the cumulative effects of positive global demand shocks. The role of the other two 
shocks was found to be negligible during that period. The impact of the distinct crude 
oil market innovations both on the macroeconomy (Kilian 2008) and on the stock 
market (Kilian and Park 2008) was also explored. Providing an important insight, the 
short-run impact of global demand shocks on both GDP and stock returns was found to 
be positive for the US, showing that, depending on the underlying structural shock, 
increasing oil prices need not necessarily produce recessionary effects. The explanation 
for the resilience of the U.S. economy during the 2003-2008 demand driven oil price 
increase could thus lie on this type of behavior.  
The previous discussion provides the motivation for the current paper. The 
empirical approach employed is based on a recursively identified VAR model of the 
crude oil market along the lines of Kilian (2008). Kilian’s VAR is modified taking into 
account Apergis and Miller’s (2009) critique so as to include only variables of the same 
order of integration, i.e. I(1). A different measure of global economic activity is also 
included in place of Kilian’s ocean freight rate index. This framework is used in this 
paper to investigate several issues. First, analysis of the crude oil market is carried out, 
searching for additional insights into the main sources of oil price fluctuations since the 
1970s. Particular interest lies in the most recent oil price surge. The obtained evidence 
supports the view that the 2002-2008 oil price increase was importantly driven by 
positive global economic activity shocks. This is in line with Kilian’s results. However, 
an important contribution of positive precautionary demand shocks between 2004 and 
2006 is additionally found in this paper, consistent e.g. with the Iraq war, changes in 
Asian consumer preferences or scarcity effects. Second, the macroeconomic effects of 
different crude oil market innovations are explored, focusing on industrial production 
and producer prices in the US. The chief advantage of this choice of variables over GDP 
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and consumer prices – as in Kilian – is that it allows for an integrated VAR approach 
that – unlike his – does not rule out possible important feedbacks from the US economy 
to the crude oil market. The results obtained indicate that distinct crude oil market 
innovations produce different macroeconomic effects. Most importantly, industrial 
production is shown to respond positively and significantly to increases in the price of 
oil caused by global activity shocks. This both complements and reinforces previous 
findings in Kilian regarding GDP, showing that increases in the price of oil may be 
associated with thriving economic activity in the US. Such a result is acceptable 
because oil demand shocks of this type, induced by booms in global economic activity, 
are expected to feed to the economy through two opposite-signed effects. On the one 
hand, a direct stimulating effect will arise naturally from increases in global demand – 
e.g. through increased exports and investment flows – while, on the other hand, 
increases in global activity will tend to raise the price of oil at the same time, thus 
indirectly producing a negative effect on US activity. Finally, the relevance of the 
structural change hypothesis proposed in the Great Moderation-related literature is 
assessed in light of this paper’s model. Evidence of a structural break in 1984 is found, 
consistent with a more muted response of US macroeconomic variables to crude oil 
market innovations in the post-1984 period. Therefore, simply allowing for differences 
in effects of the distinct crude oil market innovations does not seem to fully account for 
the observed change in the oil price-macroeconomy relationship, contrary to the view 
expressed in Lippi and Nobili (2009). Further research on the structural change 
hypothesis should thus be pursued. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents an 
overview of the relevant literature; section 3 briefly describes the VAR methodology; 
section 4 discusses the specification of the crude oil market model and the set of 
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identifying assumptions; section 5 presents an empirical analysis of the crude oil 
market; section 6 presents empirical results concerning the macroeconomic effects of oil 
market innovations and assesses the importance of the structural change hypothesis in 
light of this paper’s model; section 7 concludes. 
2. Related Literature: A brief overview 
Research interest on the economics of oil arose in the 1970s, motivated by the scenario 
of stagflation in industrialized countries that followed the first and second oil price 
shocks. The association of stagflation episodes – characterized by low growth, rising 
unemployment and high inflation – to oil price peaks in the ‘70s suggested the existence 
of a causal link between the two. Rasche and Tatom (1977, 1981), Hamilton (1983) and 
Gisser and Goodwin (1986) were among the first to report a negative relationship 
between oil prices and economic activity for the US in empirical studies, giving birth to 
a body of literature that has been growing ever since. Its relevance to the present day is 
apparent in the words of Hamilton (2005) who stated that “nine out of ten of the US 
recessions since World War II were preceded by a spike up in oil prices”. Still, despite 
the depth of the existing oil-related literature, the question of whether or not a stable 
long-term oil price-macroeconomy relationship exists still remains open, as Jones Leiby 
and Paik (2004) noted.  
Hamilton (1983) identified early signs of instability in the empirical link 
between oil prices and output. This instability started becoming more apparent as large 
price decreases (e.g. in 1986, following the OPEC collapse) failed to produce significant 
positive economic responses. Early approaches addressing this issue by Loungani 
(1986) and Davis (1987a,b) provided evidence of a nonlinear relationship that Hamilton 
(1988) attributed to the existence of oil-induced resource reallocation costs, expected to 
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aggravate the negative impact of price increases and to offset the positive effect of 
equivalent price decreases. A related strand of literature, including contributions by 
Bohi (1989, 1991), Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997) and Barsky and Kilian (2002), 
has placed emphasis on the endogenous response of monetary policy – instead of the oil 
price changes themselves – in explaining the bulk of the contractionary effects of oil 
price increases. This view offered an alternative explanation for the asymmetric 
response of the economy, based on monetary policy reacting to oil price increases but 
not decreases, a possibility suggested by Balke, Brown and Yücel (2002). Other 
mechanisms were proposed e.g. by Ferderer (1996), who investigated the role of oil 
price volatility, Huntington (1998), who attributed the asymmetry to the relationship 
between crude oil and petroleum product prices, and Atkeson and Kehoe (1999), who 
assumed putty-clay investment technology. 
While the discussion on which transmission mechanisms originate the 
asymmetry has not yet been settled, several alternative nonlinear specifications trying to 
capture the asymmetric effects of oil price shocks have been proposed. This has allowed 
for better statistical fit and improved forecasting. Relevant contributions in this area 
were put forward by Mork (1989) Lee, Ni and Ratti (1995) and Hamilton (1996,2003). 
Hamilton’s net oil price increase, in particular, has been widely used in empirical work. 
Nonetheless, regardless of their merits, asymmetric measures of oil price shocks would 
not be the final answer to the oil price-macroeconomy instability issue. Indeed, other 
important spikes in the price of oil took place after the 1970s, namely in 1990-1991, 
2000 and 2003-2008. Still, since the mid-1980s, the industrialized world has witnessed 
a time of remarkable economic stability1 – the Great Moderation documented by 
Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Stock and Watson (2005) – despite large oil price 
                                                 
1 This paper excludes analysis of the recent financial crisis period since its causes and consequences have 
not been fully understood. 
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fluctuations. Consistent with the reduced economic volatility, Hooker (1996) concluded 
that the oil-macroeconomy relationship had changed in the 1980s, leaving the US 
economy less vulnerable to oil price shocks. In trying to explain this, two main routes 
have been pursued. On the one hand, a strand of literature related to the Great 
Moderation has tried to explain the milder effects of oil price shocks in recent years 
through structural change. Structural factors such as decreased energy intensity, 
improved monetary policy and increased flexibility of labor markets have been 
consistently pointed out in the literature. “Good luck”, a non-structural factor defined as 
the absence of concurrent adverse shocks, has also been considered. For further 
discussion see e.g. Hooker (2002), Blanchard and Galí (2008) and Herrera and 
Pesavento (2009). On the other hand, as pointed out in the previous section, a new 
strand of empirical literature has started to evolve, focusing on disentangling the 
fundamental demand and supply shocks affecting the price of oil. Recent work on this 
topic has shown that, depending on the source, shocks yielding equivalent oil price 
changes may produce quite different economic effects, both in qualitative and 
quantitative terms. Accordingly, the time-varying effects of oil prices on the 
macroeconomy can be explained, at least partially, by the dynamics of the relative 
importance of the different types of shock. Evidence for the US economy regarding 
GDP, CPI inflation and stock market returns has been put forward by Kilian (2008) and 
Kilian and Park (2008). Similar implications for the US industrial production have been 
found in Lippi and Nobili (2008), although using a different approach. The current 
paper reinforces and complements the conclusions from both these contributions by 
investigating the impact of crude oil market innovations on US industrial production 
and producer prices – a set of variables similar to Lippi – using Kilian’s recursively 
identified VAR approach. 
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3. The VAR Methodology  
The empirical approach in this paper is based on the standard Vector Autoregressive 
methodology. A Vector Autoregression (VAR) is able to describe the dynamic 
evolution of a set of variables, based on their common history (Verbeek 2008), while 
allowing all variables to be treated as endogenous. An important feature of the VAR is 
that it does not require imposing a priori incredible identification restrictions, as Sims 
(1980) called them. In general, a reduced-form VAR can be written as: 
 ~ 0, Σ  1
where  is a lag polynomial of order  and  is a vector containing the set of 
variables of interest. The error terms  are assumed to be serially uncorrelated and to 
have constant variance. Since the right-hand side of 1  contains only predetermined 
variables, each equation in the VAR system can be consistently estimated by OLS 
(Enders 2004).  
Structural VAR analysis, using impulse response functions, forecast error 
variance decompositions and historical decompositions, relies on the structural form of 
the VAR: 
 ~ 0,  2
where  is a lag polynomial of order  and  is a vector containing the structural 
innovations. These are related to the reduced form disturbances, , through . 
Since innovation independence is crucial, orthogonality of the structural shocks is 
assumed to hold throughout. In order to achieve structural shock identification, a matrix 
 satisfying the following decomposition of the estimated covariance matrix, Σ, is 
required:   
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 Σ E , E , , ,  3
Exact identification of an -variable VAR system may be achieved by imposing 
/2 restrictions on the  matrix. For all models in this paper the necessary 
restrictions are imposed recursively, by means of Choleski decompositions. Impulse 
response analysis is carried out using two standard error confidence bands, computed 
from 2000 Monte Carlo replications2.  
4. Identifying Crude Oil Market Innovations 
The point of departure for the subsequent analysis is a model of the crude oil market 
based on Kilian (2008). Kilian used a recursively identified 3-variable VAR to retrieve 
three types of crude oil market innovations: oil supply shocks, global activity shocks 
and oil-specific demand shocks. These are the same I intend to identify. However, some 
slight modifications to his original framework are to be introduced.  
Kilian focused on a set of variables comprising the percentage change in world 
crude oil production, an index of global real economic activity and the real price of oil. 
Firstly, Apergis and Miller (2009) noted that Kilian’s original model incorporated 
variables with inconsistent time-series properties. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit 
root tests confirm that the percentage change in world crude oil production is a 
stationary series, i.e. I(0), while the remaining two series are non-stationary, i.e. I(1). 
Hence, in order to circumvent this problem I propose a model including global crude oil 
production in levels instead of percentage changes. Secondly, I use a measure of global 
real economic activity that is different from Kilian’s freight rate-based index: a non-
energy commodity price index, i.e., an index of commodity prices excluding oil and 
                                                 
2 10.000 replications would increase accuracy but proved to be too computationally intensive. Inference 
of the main results, however, has been verified not to depend on this choice. 
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gasoline. While acknowledging that this measure may not be flawless3 – it could 
certainly be affected by a set of other factors – fluctuations in non-energy commodity 
prices are still expected to roughly capture changes in global aggregate demand for 
commodities, reflecting shocks to global economic activity.  
Hence, I set up a VAR model of the crude oil market including the following 
three variables: global crude oil production4, , the non-energy commodity price 
index5, , and the real price of oil6, . All variables are expressed in logs. Data 
frequency is monthly and the sample ranges from 1973:2 to 2007:12, thus covering all 
the major episodes of spiking oil prices. Consistent with the previous discussion, ADF 
tests show that all series are I(1). Hence, I follow Sims (1980) and Sims, Stock and 
Watson (1990) – who clearly recommend against differencing – and estimate the VAR 
in levels in order to avoid loss of information concerning the joint dynamics of the 
variables. Possible cointegrating relationships are not included since evidence from the 
Johansen trace and maximum eigenvalue cointegration tests is largely negative. This 
choice is in line with most of the relevant oil-related literature. To conclude the 
specification of the model, the lag length, , must be chosen. The usual lag selection 
criteria provide ambiguous results. The Akaike Information Criterion, in particular – the 
best for monthly data, according to Ivanov and Kilian (2005) – suggests a number of 
lags ranging from 3 to 16, depending on the model considered. Throughout the 
remainder of the paper, in order to allow for better comparability, all results refer to 
models estimated including 12 lags. The choice of 12 lags is supported by the 
discussion in Hamilton and Herrera (2004), who argued that at least one year worth of 
                                                 
3 Kilian’s (2008) dry cargo single voyage ocean freight rate index also has shortcomings. It has been 
shown to lag increases and lead decreases in economic activity. 
4 Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA) of the U.S. Department of Energy. 
5 Source: Commodity Research Bureau. 
6 Source: EIA, extended backwards to 1973:2 as in Barsky and Kilian (2002). I thank Professor Lutz 
Kilian for gracefully providing this data. 
11 
 
lags should be included in order to capture all the relevant effects of oil price changes 
and to control for seasonal factors. It is also consistent with Kilian (2001) who pointed 
out that, for impulse response analysis, the dangers of underfitting a VAR exceed those 
of overfitting it. All important conclusions have been verified to be robust to the lag 
length choice and to hold e.g. for 6 (as in Lippi and Nobili 2009) and 24 (as in 
Kilian 2008). 
In order to perform structural analysis from such a 3-variable VAR, exact 
identification requires imposing three restrictions. The Choleski ordering of the 
variables matters and must be chosen carefully since at least one of the residual 
correlations, , , is statistically significant
7. (See Figure 1) 
Figure 1: Residual correlation matrix 
oilprod comp rpoil
oilprod  1 ‐0.027 ‐0.078
comp  ‐0.027 1 0.115
rpoil  ‐0.078 0.115 1
 
Economic reasoning should therefore be used to the largest possible extent in order to 
adequately impose the required structure upon the model. In the spirit of Kilian, I intend 
to identify three types of structural shocks: oil supply shocks, global activity shocks and 
demand shocks specific to the oil market. All innovations are defined so as to raise the 
price of oil. An oil supply shock is defined as an innovation that lowers global crude oil 
production. A global activity shock is defined as a shock that increases the demand for 
all commodities, thus causing an increase in the non-energy commodity price index. 
Finally, an oil-specific demand shock is defined as an innovation to the real price of oil 
                                                 
7 The correlations are statistically significant if | , | 2 1 √407




that is independent from supply shocks and global activity shocks, thus capturing 
idiosyncratic changes in demand. The necessary restrictions on  are motivated by the 







This identification strategy assumes, first, that oil production does not respond to global 
activity shocks and oil-specific demand shocks within the month. This is consistent with 
a vertical short-run supply curve, which seems reasonable if one considers both the 
large costs from changing production decisions and the high volatility of the crude oil 
market. Second, it assumes that the price of non-energy commodities does not respond 
contemporaneously to oil market-specific shocks. This is in conformity with the delayed 
response of global economic activity empirically observed after the main episodes of 
spiking oil prices. Third and finally, the real price of oil is expected to reflect changes in 
all the factors affecting the crude oil market. Therefore, it is allowed to respond 
immediately to all three types of innovations.  
Before proceeding, consider the oil-specific demand shock for a moment. Being 
orthogonal to oil supply and global activity shocks by construction, it is designed so as 
to capture idiosyncratic changes in the demand for oil alone, as opposed to changes in 
the demand for all commodities. I follow Kilian’s argument in regarding this type of 
shock as mainly reflecting swings in the precautionary demand for oil, triggered by 
fears about future supply shortfalls. Therefore, I will from now on refer to such shocks 





5. The Crude Oil Market 
The history of oil has been characterized by a great deal of price volatility. The major 
episodes of increasing oil prices are shown in Figure 2. Two occurred during the ‘70s, 
in 1974 and 1979, and three more later on, in 1991, 1999 and 2002-2008. It is worth 
noting that the most recent episode, in particular, appears to have been somewhat 
different from all of the previous ones in the sense that the price increase was not as 
immediate, rather being more prolonged and sustained.  
Figure 2: Real price of oil (1973:2-2007:12) 
 
The differences in behavior of the price of oil across oil shocks suggest that 
different forces may have been driving it in different periods. The structural model of 
the crude oil market presented in the previous section can be used to shed some light 
upon this possibility. The historical decomposition of the real price of oil is computed 
based on the set of identifying restrictions discussed before. Figure 2 shows the 
accumulated effect of each structural shock on the real price of oil between 1975:1 and 
2007:12. Analysis of the post-1975 period indicates that – contrary to the conventional 
view – oil supply shocks played no important role in the major episodes of increasing 
oil prices. Rather, evidence suggests that every oil price shock prior to the 2002-2008 
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detailed discussion of the events triggering such swings is outside the scope of this 
paper and has already been provided in Kilian (2008). Regarding the accumulated effect 
of global activity shocks on the real price of oil prior to 2003, it appears that innovations 
to the aggregate world demand have only contributed more or less significantly for the 
1979-1980 oil price increase. The role of such shocks during the remaining episodes 
was negligible.  
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Focusing on the 2002-2008 period, however, the difference relative to previous 
episodes clearly emerges. Unlike earlier shocks, the prolonged and sustained increase in 
the price of oil in recent years was largely driven by a series of positive global economic 
activity shocks. This is in line with Kilian’s (2008) results and is further supported by 
evidence in Lippi and Nobili (2009) and Hamilton (2008). Such a series of shocks may 
be largely attributed to the rapid growth of newly industrialized Asian countries. The 
large booms in China and India are commonly regarded as having fueled the world 
economy until recently. Thus, they are likely to have boosted global demand for oil 
during the period in question. My results, however, differ from those in Kilian in one 
important issue. I find a significant role for precautionary demand shocks in raising the 
price of oil in the 2004-2006 period while his results showed no important contributions 
from such innovations. The divergence may arise either from the usage of different 
measures of global economic activity or from the differences in model specification (see 
section 4). The contribution of precautionary demand shocks for the recent oil price 
surge may be explained in light of several distinct factors deserving future investigation. 
The Iraq war, launched in March 2003, is an obvious candidate, although the historical 
decomposition shows that the largest effect took place only in 2004 and 2005. It would 
be natural for a war involving such a relevant oil-exporting country to raise fears about 
supply disruptions, thus boosting precautionary demand and the price of oil. The 
delayed response of precautionary demand relative to the outbreak of the war could be 
justified by the fact that the increasing post-war instability only started becoming more 
apparent outside Iraq – consistent with the sense of failure regarding the war that started 
to arise in some circles – after some time. An alternative explanation for this finding 
could lie on significant changes in the preferences of Asian consumers, towards energy-
consuming durable goods, induced by the recent wealth increases in China and India. 
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Another possibility is that the effects of an increased scarcity rent are being captured 
instead. Such a scarcity rent, regarded by Hamilton (2008) as an important feature of the 
most recent data, would arise from increasing concerns about future resource depletion. 
 Given the evidence gathered from the historical decomposition – supporting the 
idea that distinct factors have been driving prices in different periods – it is important to 
assess in greater detail how the price of oil responds to each type of structural shock, 
before extending the analysis to US macroeconomic variables. Figure 4 shows the 
response of the real price of oil to oil supply shocks, global activity shocks and 
precautionary demand shocks, up to a 2 year horizon.  
Figure 4: Responses of Real Price of Oil 
 
The response to an oil supply shock is shown to be positive during the first two years 
but is only close to being statistically significant for the first 7 months. The response to 
a global activity shock, on the other hand, is positive and statistically significant during 
the first 10 months, corresponding to a gradual but steady increase in the real price of 
oil. It still remains positive afterwards although slightly decreasing and not statistically 
significant. Finally, a precautionary demand shock clearly induces a positive response 
that remains statistically significant for 4 years, clearly causing a larger and more 
immediate increase in the price of oil than the other two shocks. The impulse response 
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approach. Moreover, these results prove perfectly consistent with the previous 
discussion on the characteristics and sources of oil shocks through time.  
Since both the magnitude and the shape of the oil price response clearly depend 
on the underlying structural shock, it seems natural to expect different crude oil market 
innovations to produce distinct macroeconomic effects. The effects of the different 
structural shocks on a measure of real economic activity – industrial production – and a 
measure of the price level – producer price index – for the US are explored in the next 
section. 
6. The Crude Oil Market and the Macroeconomy 
The VAR model from section 4 is extended so as to allow for an analysis of the 
macroeconomic effects of crude oil market innovations. Two additional variables for the 
US economy are included8: the (log of) US industrial production index, , and the (log 
of) US producer price index, . ADF unit root tests show that both additional 
variables are I(1). Again, the extended model is estimated in levels, including 12 lags. 
This choice of macroeconomic variables is similar to Lippi and Nobili (2009), allowing 
for an interesting comparability between their results and mine. Lippi and Nobili 
achieve identification by imposing sign restrictions and identify only two oil market 
innovations: oil supply shocks and oil-demand shocks. My analysis fundamentally 
differs from theirs as I use a recursive identification strategy and further disentangle oil 
demand shocks into global activity shocks and precautionary demand shocks, thus 
identifying three distinct crude oil market innovations. Although industrial production 
and producer prices are certainly not perfect proxies for US output and consumer prices 
– the share of manufactured goods in spending has declined considerably – this analysis 
                                                 
8 Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
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proves complementary of Kilian’s results regarding those variables. The chief 
advantage of this set of variables over Kilian’s is that it allows for an integrated VAR 
analysis. Kilian, instead, separately regressed GDP growth and CPI inflation on the 
innovations obtained from his structural crude oil market model. Such an approach rules 
out possibly important feedbacks from the US economy to the crude oil market. The 
reason he did so is that GDP data is only available at quarterly frequency while the 
identifying assumptions discussed in section 4 cease being credible at a quarterly time 
horizon. Industrial production data, on the other hand, is available at monthly 
frequency. 
In order to exactly identify the resulting 5-variable VAR, 10 restrictions are 
imposed as shown in 5 : 
 
 








This identification strategy assumes that all variables in the crude oil market block are 
predetermined with respect to the US economy – following the standard approach in the 
literature – and are thus contemporaneously unaffected by US-specific innovations. 
Conversely, both US industrial production and US producer prices are allowed to 
respond immediately to all crude oil market innovations. I do not attempt to identify 
truly structural shocks in the US economy. All subsequent analysis is performed based 
on the model including industrial production before producer prices. The results, 




6.1. Estimation Results 
The interest in oil price shocks arises mainly from the perception that they are a relevant 
source of real economic fluctuations. In order to quantify this claim, the variance 
decomposition of US industrial production is computed from the model described 
above. Table 1 shows the percentage of the forecast error variance accounted for by 
each shock, individually, and by all crude oil market innovations as a group. 
Table 1: Variance decomposition of Industrial Production 
Structural shocks
period  oil supply  global activity precautionary demand
oil shocks 
total 
1  2.802  3.092 0.181 6.075 
6  3.688  13.414 0.059 17.160 
12  5.394  10.069 0.810 16.273 
24  9.045  4.933 6.521 20.499 
48  10.688  4.138 11.473 26.300 
 
Analysis of the variance decomposition confirms that crude oil market innovations 
account for a significant share of US industrial production fluctuations, amounting to 
over 16% at a 1 year horizon and approaching 30% as the time horizon expands. 
Among the three innovations considered, global activity shocks explain most of the 
forecast error variance during the first year. For larger horizons oil supply shocks and 
precautionary demand shocks become more important, accounting for over 10% of the 
long-run variance each. 
In order to analyze the macroeconomic impact of crude oil market innovations in 
greater detail, a set of impulse response functions is computed. Figures 5 and 6 show the 
responses of US industrial production and US producer prices, respectively, to oil 
supply, global activity and precautionary demand shocks. It is clear from the impulse 
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response functions that both the nature and the magnitude of the effects of oil price 
fluctuations on the US economy depend on the underlying structural shocks.  
Figure 5: Responses of Industrial Production 
 
Figure 6: Responses of Producer Prices 
 
An oil supply shock is shown to significantly depress industrial production during most 
of the first 20 months after the shock. Afterwards, the impact remains negative but 
becomes non-significant. The impact on producer prices, on the other hand, is non-
significant at first and actually becomes significantly negative after the first 15 months. 
This particular result may look surprising at first. Nonetheless, it can be understood if 
the positive direct effect of the higher price of oil on producer prices proves to be 
weaker than the negative indirect effect, induced by the resulting decrease in real 
economic activity. A global activity shock, on the other hand, is shown to have a 
significant positive effect on industrial production during the first 10 months after the 
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year. It thus appears as if the positive direct effect of a global activity shock on the US 
industrial production dominates the negative indirect effect that works through the 
increased price of oil, at least in the short-run. Producer prices, in turn, rise in a gradual 
and sustained manner in response to such a shock. The impact remains statistically 
significant for 4 years. Such a response arises naturally since, in this particular case, the 
direct and indirect effects work in the same direction, as both real economic activity and 
the price of oil tend to increase. Finally, a precautionary demand shock is shown to 
cause a negative impact on industrial production that, however, is never statistically 
significant. Its impact on producer prices, on the other hand, is immediate and 
significantly positive for the first 25 months. It thus appears as if the direct positive 
effect of the oil price increase on producer prices dominates the negative indirect effect, 
induced through the decline in real economic activity.  
The clear difference in effects of precautionary demand and oil supply shocks on 
producer prices can be better understood in light of the impulse responses of US 
industrial production and the real price of oil. Recall from the last section (see Figure 4) 
that the positive effect of a precautionary demand shock on the price of oil is much 
stronger and more significant than that of an oil supply shock. Additionally, the 
negative effect of a precautionary demand shock on industrial production appears to be 
weaker and less significant than that of an oil supply shock. Since the precautionary 
demand shock both raises the price of oil more and seems to decrease real economic 
activity less, its impact on prices will naturally be more inflationary. 
The results concerning the impact of global activity shocks on industrial 
production, on the other hand, appear particularly interesting in explaining the thriving 
behavior of the US economy during the 2002-2008 period. As discussed in the previous 
section (see Figure 3) evidence suggests that the most recent surge in the price of oil 
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was importantly driven by a sequence of positive global activity shocks. Impulse 
response analysis of such shocks – showing that increases in the price of oil may be 
associated to expanding real economic activity – provides an explanation for the 
apparently puzzling fact that the US did not experience a recession for several years, 
despite sharp increases in the price of oil.  
These results both complement and reinforce Kilian’s conclusions concerning 
US GDP and consumer prices. All impulse response functions obtained in this paper are 
qualitatively consistent with his, although some slight differences exist. This is to be 
expected since distinct measures of economic activity and the price level are being used. 
Specifically, the positive short-run response of industrial production to global activity 
shocks seems to be more prolonged and more significant than that of GDP. This is not 
surprising since the production of manufactured goods is likely to be more stimulated 
by booms in global economic activity – relative to GDP as a whole – through rises in 
the demand for exports. Furthermore, producer prices – compared to consumer prices – 
are shown to respond in a more immediate and significant manner to precautionary 
demand shocks. This can be understood in light of the greater energy intensity of the 
industrial sector relative to the economy as a whole. This feature of the industrial sector 
is likely to cause increases in the price of oil to feed more into producer prices than into 
consumer prices. The main results obtained in this paper are also consistent with Lippi 
and Nobili (2009) who found similar implications for the US industrial production and 
producer prices, while only identifying two oil market innovations. Result comparison 
shows a very similar pattern of macroeconomic responses to oil supply shocks. It 
suggests also that the oil demand shock identified in their paper captures some mix of 




6.2. Structural Change? 
In a recent contribution, Blanchard and Galí (2008) pointed out four relevant factors in 
explaining the milder effects of oil price shocks on the US economy after the mid 
1980s: “good luck”, smaller share of oil in production, more flexible labor markets and 
improvements in monetary policy. This view integrates in a strand of literature that has 
focused on the hypothesis of structural change in trying to explain the breakdown in the 
oil price-macroeconomy relationship, apparent after the beginning of the Great 
Moderation, in 1984. This strand of Great Moderation-related literature, however, has 
generally neglected the difference in effects of distinct crude oil market innovations 
such as the ones identified in the current paper. Instead of trying to disentangle such 
innovations, conventional approaches have identified a single oil price shock. As a 
result, the estimated effects of such an oil price shock could actually be capturing some 
mix of effects of the different crude oil market shocks. This is likely to have contributed 
for the finding of coefficient instability in models where only the single shock was 
considered. Figure 7 plots the evolution of the structural innovations since 1975, 
providing visual evidence supporting the possibility that the relative importance of the 
distinct structural shocks has been significantly varying over time.  

































Graphical analysis of the structural shock series indicates that the variance of oil supply 
innovations decreased after 1991 while that of precautionary demand shocks, on the 
other hand, became larger after the 1986 period. Since basic evidence suggests that 
conventional single-shock approaches may have been flawed, up to some extent, it is 
worth reassessing the structural change hypothesis in light of this paper’s model.  
I test for a structural break in 1984:1 – the standard date suggested by the Great 
Moderation literature (e.g. McConnel and Perez-Quiros 2000) – using the Chow break 
point and sample split tests for vector models (see Candelon and Lütkepohl 2001). 
Inference based on bootstrapped p-values clearly points to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of parameter constancy even at the 1% level. Accordingly, I split the full 
sample into two subsamples – 1973:2-1984:1 and 1984:2-2007:12 – in order to further 
investigate the differences between both periods.  
Table 2 presents the variance decomposition – regarding oil supply and 
precautionary demand shocks only – of the US industrial production for the first and 
second subsamples, respectively. 
Table 2: Variance decomposition of Industrial Production 
1st Subsample 2nd Subsample 
period  oil supply  precautionary demand oil supply precautionary demand 
1  3.260  15.324 1.448 2.036 
6  3.314  12.789 1.210 0.821 
12  19.305  12.448 1.103 1.196 
24  31.783  11.549 1.604 6.044 
48  27.441  10.084 2.727 14.714 
 
The variance decomposition results appear consistent with the previous discussion on 
the variance of the structural shocks. In the first subsample, the percentage of the 
forecast error variance of industrial production explained by oil supply shocks is larger 
than the share explained by precautionary demand shocks for time horizons over one 
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year. It is also larger in the first subsample than in the second, for all periods 
considered. In the second subsample, conversely, a larger share of fluctuations in 
industrial production is attributed to precautionary demand shocks than to oil supply 
shocks.  
Impulse response analysis may provide further insights into the nature of the 
changing effects of crude oil market innovations on the real side of the US economy. 
Figure 7 plots the responses of US industrial production for both subsamples. 
Figure 7: Responses of Industrial Production 
 
 
The overall picture shows that the impact of one standard deviation innovations on US 
industrial production has become much more muted after 1984. More specifically, the 
impact of oil supply shocks has been found to be negative and statistically significant 
for several periods in the first subsample while in the second subsample, although 
slightly negative, it is never significant. The effect of global activity shocks, on the 
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subsample and for 5 months in the second, although smaller in magnitude. Since these 
responses are based on one standard deviation innovations, however, it is possible that 
the milder effects found in the second sample are partly a product of declines in the 
standard deviations of oil supply and global activity shocks, relative to the pre-1984 
period. Among all three innovations, only precautionary demand shocks have a larger 
standard deviation in the second subsample. Impulse response analysis of the impact of 
such a shock on industrial production shows that, despite the larger standard deviation, 
the magnitude of its effect is smaller and generally less significant in the period after 
1984. More surprisingly, the impact of a precautionary demand shock on industrial 
production in the second sample is actually found to be significantly positive for the 
first 2 months. This finding may be hard to reconcile with standard economic theory 
unless some other offsetting effect has been at work. This could be evidence supporting 
e.g. changes in the response of monetary policy to such shocks or “good luck” i.e. the 
existence of simultaneous shocks – unaccounted for by the model – with opposite-
signed effects. I leave further analysis of this issue for future research. The overall 
message that seems to stand out from this basic approach is – at odds with Lippi and 
Nobili (2009) – that the different effects of the distinct crude oil market shocks, on their 
own, cannot account for all of the change in the oil price-macroeconomy relationship. 
Hence, this paper finds that the structural change hypothesis remains valid and should 
be further pursued.  
7. Concluding Remarks 
This paper offers three main contributions. First, besides reinforcing the prevailing view 
that the 2002-2008 episode of increasing oil prices was largely induced by positive 
global economic activity shocks, it provides new evidence supporting a relevant role for 
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positive swings in precautionary demand, mainly during the 2004-2006 period. The Iraq 
War, changes in Asian consumer preferences towards more energy intensive durable 
goods and scarcity rents are put forward as potential explanations for such swings 
although no evidence favoring any of them in particular is provided. Deeper research 
concerning this issue would be required. Second, it provides further evidence implying 
that oil price increases may walk hand in hand with thriving economic activity in the 
US. This is inferred from the estimated positive short-run response of US industrial 
production to global activity shocks and is argued – in line with Kilian’s findings 
regarding GDP – to be relevant in explaining the prolonged resilience of the US 
economy in face of the recent oil price increases. The results concerning industrial 
production and producer prices are consistent with those in Lippi and Nobili (2009) 
although a different empirical approach is employed and an additional oil demand 
innovation is identified. This conclusion thus appears to be robust to alternative 
identification strategies. Such a response to global activity shocks may be understood in 
light of two opposite signed effects: a stimulating effect working mainly through 
increased export demand and a negative effect working through the higher price of oil. 
Similar results have been found for a set of other countries including Portugal, Spain, 
the United Kingdom and Germany. Since these results would not add to the conceptual 
analysis, they were left out of the text in order to avoid excess length. A more detailed 
international comparison of the effects of crude oil market innovations on the 
macroeconomy may be subject of future empirical work based on this paper’s 
framework. Third and finally, the relevance of Blanchard and Galí’s hypothesis of 
structural change is supported by parameter constancy tests, variance decompositions 
analysis, and impulse analysis that shows more muted responses to oil price increases in 
the post-1984 period. The line of research on the structural change hypothesis should 
28 
 
thus continue to be pursued although empirical evidence suggests that it should take into 
account the arguments from the strand of literature that has focused on disentangling 
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